How Eisenkot Could Repair the U.S.-Israel Alliance

The U.S.-Israel relationship remains one of Washington’s most important security partnerships, but its political foundation has weakened. Intelligence sharing, missile-defense cooperation, military technology, and shared concern about Iran and armed groups continue to bind the two countries together. Yet those institutional ties coexist with growing disagreements over military strategy, civilian protection, diplomacy, regional escalation, and political leadership.

The problem is not limited to one policy dispute or one American administration. It reflects a deeper loss of trust between Israeli and American leaders, combined with political polarization in both countries. American support for Israel is also facing greater public scrutiny, particularly over the conduct and objectives of military operations.

Gadi Eisenkot could offer a possible path toward repair. His military background, national-security experience, and potential role in an effort to replace Benjamin Netanyahu could give him credibility with Israel’s security establishment and political center. Reports have described Eisenkot as moving closer to an effort to oust Netanyahu and, in one account, being charged with forming a coalition to replace him (Source 3), while the Jewish Telegraphic Agency has reported on his possible movement toward a campaign against Netanyahu (Source 7).

That reporting indicates political positioning, not a guaranteed transfer of power. Eisenkot could create an opportunity for repair, but he could not solve the alliance’s problems through personality alone.

Why the Relationship Is Strained

The Alliance Has Outgrown Its Political Framework

The U.S.-Israel alliance extends beyond military assistance. It includes intelligence cooperation, missile defense, defense technology, regional deterrence, diplomatic coordination, and joint planning around threats from Iran and armed groups.

These relationships are deeply institutionalized. They involve defense ministries, intelligence services, military commands, research institutions, and legislatures. That depth gives the alliance resilience during periods of political disagreement.

Institutional strength, however, cannot fully compensate for leadership-level distrust. When American and Israeli leaders publicly contradict one another, disagree over war aims, or announce major decisions without adequate consultation, security cooperation may continue while political confidence declines.

The result is a relationship that can function operationally while becoming increasingly fragile strategically. Washington may continue sharing intelligence and supporting missile defense while questioning whether Israeli policy advances broader American interests. Israel may continue relying on American assistance while believing that Washington does not fully understand its security requirements.

The central challenge is not whether the alliance exists. It does. The challenge is whether its political leaders can manage disagreement without damaging the cooperation beneath it.

Strategic Priorities Are No Longer Fully Aligned

Israel and the United States may identify the same threats while disagreeing over how to address them.

Israel’s immediate priorities often include eliminating armed threats, preserving freedom of military action, deterring adversaries, and maintaining domestic political stability. American policymakers must also consider regional escalation, civilian protection, relations with Arab partners, international legitimacy, and the risk of a wider war.

These priorities can collide during a prolonged conflict. Israeli officials may view sustained military pressure as necessary to deter future attacks. American officials may worry that an open-ended operation is strengthening adversaries, destabilizing neighboring states, or undermining diplomatic options.

The disagreement is therefore not simply about whether Israel has a right to defend itself. It concerns the limits, methods, objectives, and political consequences of that defense.

A military campaign without a clear political end state creates particular pressure on the alliance. Washington needs to know what military action is intended to achieve, what conditions would end it, and what political arrangement would follow. Without those answers, American support becomes harder to explain to Congress and the public.

Domestic Politics Have Become Foreign Policy

Israeli coalition politics now have direct consequences for Washington. Domestic partners can influence decisions on military operations, humanitarian policy, settlements, regional diplomacy, and Palestinian governance. American officials may therefore judge Israeli policy through the lens of internal coalition pressures.

The reverse is also true. American domestic debate increasingly shapes policy toward Israel. Congressional support, presidential decisions, public opinion, and divisions within political parties all affect the relationship.

Public disputes between leaders can encourage opposition movements, complicate congressional support, reduce diplomatic flexibility, and make long-term planning more difficult. They can also turn strategic disagreements into symbols of national political identity.

The New York Times has described the relationship as fractured and presented Eisenkot as a potential figure who could address its political and strategic problems (Source 1). The Washington Post has also covered an Israeli election and the candidates and issues shaping the campaign (Source 9).

Who Is Gadi Eisenkot?

Eisenkot is a former senior Israeli military leader with experience in national-security planning and strategic decision-making. That background could matter in a country where voters and institutions place substantial weight on security credentials.

Military experience can provide familiarity with operational realities, escalation risks, intelligence assessments, and the limits of force. It can also give a political leader credibility with Israel’s defense establishment and security-focused voters.

It does not guarantee diplomatic success. Commanding a military and governing a divided country require different skills. A prime minister must manage coalition partners, public expectations, economic pressures, international relations, and legal obligations. Eisenkot would need to demonstrate that he can translate security experience into a coherent political strategy.

Available reporting describes Eisenkot as a possible central figure in efforts to replace Netanyahu. NewsCord reported that he was charged with forming an Israeli coalition to replace Netanyahu (Source 3). The Jewish Telegraphic Agency separately reported that he was moving closer to an effort to oust Netanyahu (Source 7).

These reports should be treated as evidence of political momentum or positioning, not proof that Eisenkot will become prime minister. His prospects would depend on election results, coalition negotiations, support from centrist and opposition parties, and the durability of any government he formed.

Washington could view Eisenkot as a different kind of partner because he may combine security credibility with a less confrontational governing style and greater emphasis on institutional coordination. That would not eliminate policy disagreements, but it could improve the process through which they are handled.

How Eisenkot Could Repair the Relationship

1. Rebuild Leader-to-Leader Trust

Eisenkot’s first task would be to establish predictable communication with the White House. Regular private strategic consultations would reduce public surprises and give both governments space to resolve disputes before they become political crises.

That channel should include the Israeli prime minister’s office, the U.S. National Security Council, defense ministries, intelligence agencies, and diplomatic teams. Major military or regional decisions should be discussed in advance whenever possible.

Trust does not require identical views. It requires reliable communication, clear expectations, and confidence that disagreements will not be exploited for domestic political purposes.

2. Define Limited Military Objectives

Military campaigns need measurable objectives and political end states. Eisenkot could work with Washington to clarify:

• The threat being addressed.
• The limits of military action.
• Civilian-protection standards.
• Humanitarian-access procedures.
• Conditions for de-escalation.
• The desired post-conflict political arrangement.

This would give Washington a clearer basis for support, reduce the risk of open-ended operations, and improve international credibility. It would also connect military action to a broader strategy rather than treating force as a substitute for political planning.

Strategic clarity would not require Israel to surrender its right to self-defense. It would require the government to explain how military action advances a defined national objective.

3. Establish a Credible Civilian-Protection Policy

Civilian harm has become one of the most significant sources of friction between Israel and the United States. An Eisenkot government could address that problem through more transparent rules of engagement, independent review of serious incidents, reliable aid-delivery mechanisms, and regular communication with American officials.

Public reporting on investigations and corrective measures would also matter. Accountability would not resolve the wider conflict, but it could demonstrate that Israel takes civilian protection seriously and responds to failures.

This is both a moral obligation and an alliance-management requirement. American support becomes more difficult when Washington cannot explain how Israeli operations are being conducted or whether concerns are being addressed.

4. Restore Diplomatic Coordination

Diplomacy should be treated as part of security strategy, not as a separate activity that begins after military policy has failed.

Eisenkot could coordinate more closely with Washington before major regional initiatives, maintain communication with Arab partners, support practical de-escalation arrangements, and define realistic conditions for negotiations. He could also prevent unilateral actions from creating avoidable crises.

Diplomatic coordination can strengthen deterrence by giving military policy a clearer political purpose. Negotiations may remain difficult and unpopular, but refusing diplomacy altogether can leave Israel with fewer options and place greater pressure on its American partner.

5. Strengthen Institutions Beyond the Prime Minister’s Office

A durable alliance cannot depend on one leader’s relationship with one president. Eisenkot could strengthen cooperation between the U.S. Congress and the Knesset, defense ministries, intelligence services, foreign ministries, emergency-management agencies, and technology institutions.

Bipartisan engagement in Washington would be essential. Israeli diplomacy should not depend exclusively on one American party or administration. Regular briefings, parliamentary exchanges, and professional-level consultations could preserve cooperation during leadership transitions.

Institutional resilience would not prevent political disagreements. It would make them less damaging.

6. Address the American Debate Over Support for Israel

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies has published an article titled “Is America turning against Israel?” The supplied material does not include the article’s text, so its specific arguments cannot be assessed here (Source 5).

The title nevertheless reflects a broader political reality: support for Israel is increasingly subject to public scrutiny. Questions about military conduct, civilian harm, U.S. leverage, and the future of the conflict influence debate among voters and policymakers.

Eisenkot could respond by engaging both political parties, explaining Israeli security concerns without dismissing American criticism, accepting legitimate oversight, and showing that American assistance supports a defined strategy.

Public diplomacy cannot substitute for policy changes. A more persuasive message from Jerusalem would need to be supported by visible decisions on military objectives, civilian protection, regional diplomacy, and governance.

What Eisenkot Should Not Promise

A new leader could improve the tone of the alliance, but he could not erase strategic disagreements, regional threats, American political divisions, Israeli coalition pressures, or disputes over Palestinian governance and statehood.

Eisenkot should present himself as a potential manager of disagreement, not as a single-person solution. U.S. policy would still depend on the president, Congress, public opinion, legal assessments, humanitarian concerns, and regional developments.

Domestic trade-offs could not be avoided. A pragmatic agenda might face opposition from right-wing coalition partners, nationalist constituencies, security hawks, and groups skeptical of diplomatic concessions. Repairing ties with Washington might require difficult decisions inside Israel.

That political cost cannot be hidden through messaging. A government that promises better relations abroad while avoiding domestic choices would quickly lose credibility in both capitals.

The Political Obstacles to an Eisenkot Government

Replacing Netanyahu would require more than personal popularity. Eisenkot would need to assemble a stable parliamentary majority, reconcile ideological differences, and govern under wartime pressure.

The central questions would be difficult:

• Can Eisenkot form a durable coalition?
• Which parties would join it?
• Can centrist and opposition factions share a governing program?
• Would coalition partners accept limits on military policy?
• Could the government survive public anger, security emergencies, and economic strain?

Israeli voters may prioritize security, accountability, economic stability, or political change in different combinations. Eisenkot would need to explain how his government would protect the country, manage the conflict, address public demands, and work with international partners.

American officials, meanwhile, would need to avoid appearing to select Israel’s next leader. Open American preference for one candidate could damage that candidate’s legitimacy and deepen Israeli political polarization.

A new government could also inherit the same security threats and institutional constraints. Leadership change, policy change, and strategic transformation are different developments. Only sustained implementation would determine whether the alliance actually improved.

A Practical First-Year Agenda

The First 100 Days

An Eisenkot government could begin with six steps:

1. Hold a formal U.S.-Israel strategic dialogue.
2. Agree on communication procedures for military and diplomatic crises.
3. Review military objectives and civilian-protection mechanisms.
4. Reopen structured engagement with Congress.
5. Coordinate regional diplomacy with Washington and key Arab governments.
6. Publish a framework linking long-term security planning to diplomacy.

These steps would not resolve the conflict. They would establish procedures for managing it.

The First Year

Over the following year, the government could build a bipartisan American outreach strategy, institutionalize regular consultations, and develop a shared approach to Iran and regional deterrence.

It could also establish measurable humanitarian and governance benchmarks, create a joint process for managing disagreements before they become public crises, and evaluate progress through concrete indicators rather than leader statements.

Possible indicators would include fewer public disputes caused by policy surprises, more consistent humanitarian access, regular congressional consultations, clearer military objectives, and coordinated regional initiatives.

What a Repaired Relationship Would Look Like

A healthier U.S.-Israel relationship would not require complete policy agreement. It would include open disagreement without public rupture, clear expectations about military operations, regular strategic consultation, greater congressional and public transparency, coordinated regional diplomacy, and strong security cooperation accompanied by credible accountability.

Repair should not mean returning to an idealized past. The alliance has changed because the region, both countries’ politics, and public expectations have changed. The goal is a relationship capable of managing disagreement without damaging core cooperation.

That requires stronger institutions, more disciplined leadership, and a clear connection between security decisions and political objectives.

Conclusion: Eisenkot’s Opportunity Is Political, Not Magical

The U.S.-Israel relationship is strained because strategic and political disagreements have accumulated over time. Military cooperation remains substantial, but political trust has weakened.

Eisenkot’s potential value would come from his security credibility, a possible break from Netanyahu-era tensions, more disciplined communication, a clearer link between military policy and diplomacy, and greater attention to bipartisan American support.

His success would depend on more than changing the prime minister’s office. It would require a stable coalition, credible civilian-protection policies, realistic diplomacy, institutional cooperation, and sustained trust-building.

The alliance does not need identical leaders or identical policies. It needs a credible way to disagree without breaking the partnership.

Frequently Asked Questions

Could Gadi Eisenkot actually repair the U.S.-Israel relationship?

He could improve communication, strategic coordination, and diplomatic credibility. He could not eliminate the underlying disagreements or guarantee a complete restoration of trust.

Why is the U.S.-Israel relationship considered broken?

The fracture reflects disputes over military strategy, civilian protection, diplomacy, domestic politics, and the future direction of the alliance. Security cooperation remains strong, but political trust has weakened.

Is Eisenkot expected to replace Benjamin Netanyahu?

The supplied reports describe political efforts and coverage of Eisenkot’s possible role in replacing Netanyahu. His ability to form a government would depend on election results, coalition negotiations, and parliamentary support.

Would Eisenkot be more supportive of the United States than Netanyahu?

His leadership style could be more predictable and cooperative, especially on coordination and public diplomacy. That would not mean accepting every American position or abandoning Israel’s security priorities.

What should Eisenkot do first if he becomes prime minister?

He should establish a strategic dialogue with Washington, clarify military objectives, improve civilian-protection policies, and rebuild bipartisan relationships in the United States.

Can the alliance survive another Israeli leadership change?

Yes. The relationship rests on deep institutional and security ties. Its long-term stability would depend on whether both governments rebuild trust and create durable mechanisms for managing disagreements.